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Abstract 
There is no ‘international bar’ that regulates the practice of forensic advocacy before 
international courts and tribunals. The lack of common ethical standards for 
representatives before international courts and tribunals has been becoming increasingly 
topical, particularly in the field of investment arbitration. Initiatives by such professional 
organizations as the International Law Association and the International Bar Association 
to identify universal ethical principles suggest that there is a body of opinion amongst 
practitioners who believe that common ethical standards are necessary. However, the 
topic remains virgin territory in relation to the European Court of Justice and the 
European Court of Human Rights. This article examines the historical evolution of the 
representation before the Courts and the procedural and ethical problems concerning 
representatives that have arisen in practice. It concludes that, far from being a topic of 
only theoretical interest, there have been considerable problems in practice arising from 
questionable professional conduct by representatives and conflicting national standards. 
It suggests that the absence of a prescribed code of conduct setting out the Courts’ 
precise standard for representatives is a threat to the Courts’ procedural integrity and 
legitimacy. It proposes that the Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe take the 
lead in drafting a code of conduct for the European Courts, in consultation with their 
judiciaries, which could subsequently be adopted by the Courts and integrated into 
national codes of conduct. 
 
There has been increasing interest in recent years in the field of professional ethics for 
counsel appearing before international courts and tribunals.1 With the qualified exception 
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of the criminal tribunals,2 international courts and tribunals (‘international courts’) do not 
have prescribed codes of conduct binding upon agents and counsel. Activity amongst 
professional organizations to identify and formulate ethical principles common to 
divergent national jurisdictions, notably the ‘Hague Principles on Ethical Standards for 
Counsel Appearing before International Courts and Tribunals’ drafted by the 
International Law Association Study Group on the Practice and Procedure of 
International Courts and Tribunals, has grown.3 The ILA Hague Principles represent the 
first attempt to articulate common ethical standards for counsel for all international 
courts. 
 Ethical standards for representatives4 before the European Court of Justice 
(CJEU) at Luxembourg and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) at Strasbourg 
(‘the European Courts’) have never been comprehensively examined.  Through analysis 
of the procedural rules and jurisprudence of these Courts through the framework of the 
Hague Principles, this article argues that common ethical standards for counsel are 
crucial to protect the procedural integrity and legitimacy of the European Courts. It 
suggests that the prescription of codes of conduct by a professional organization with 
links to national bars (e.g., the CCBE5) with appropriate judicial consultation would be 
the ideal drafting process to ensure a careful, well-informed, and deliberate outcome. Far 
from being an unwelcome intrusion into practitioners’ and judges’ work, such a code 
could be of great use to them as a means of harmonizing divergent national  standards 
and equipping the Courts to address ethical issues within a clear framework.  
 While the CJEU and ECtHR have different histories, jurisdictions, and 
procedures, they are examined comparatively for two reasons: (1) they share many 
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common constituents, as all EU members must also be party to the European Convention 
on Human Rights 1950 (ECHR); and (2) the Treaty of Lisbon envisages the eventual 
accession of the EU to the ECHR,6 thus creating a direct relationship between them. This 
article first sets out the historical development of advocacy before the European Courts. 
Secondly, it sets out the admission requirements for counsel. Thirdly, it analyses certain 
problems that have arisen in the Courts’ practice concerning the professional conduct of 
counsel with illustrative reference to the Hague Principles. Fourthly, it examines the 
disciplinary powers of the Courts towards counsel. Finally, it proposes that the CCBE 
draft codes of conduct to professionalize advocacy before the European Courts. 
   
1  Historical Background7 
The CJEU was created in 1952 as the judicial body of the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) by a Protocol on the Code of the Court of Justice (ECSC Protocol) 
annexed to the Treaty of Paris 1951 (ECSC Treaty).8 In 1958, the ‘Protocol on the Statute 
of the Court of Justice’9 (ECJ Statute) was annexed to the Treaty of Rome 1957. The first 
Rules of Procedure (ECSC Rules), enacted on 4 March 1953,10 were ‘inspired by’ the ICJ 
Rules and national codes.11 The travaux préparatoires to the Statute and Rules remain 
unpublished.12 
The scholarship in French and English does not generally discuss the professional 
ethics of advocacy.13 However, Brown and Kennedy write: 
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 L. Delvaux, La Cour de Justice de la Communauté Européenne du Charbon et de l’Acier (1956), at 251. 
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 Ibid., at 45–46. See also Riese, ‘Die Verfahrensordnung des Gerichtshofes der Europäischen 
Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl’, 6 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (1953) 52, at 521. 
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 J. de Richemont, Communauté européenne du charbon et de l’acier: La cour de justice, code annoté 
guide pratique, (1954), at 101-106-3; D.G. Valentine, The Court of Justice of the European Communities 
(1965), i, at 47–50; A.G. Toth, Legal Protection of Individuals in the European Communities (ii, Remedies 
and Procedures)(1978), at 11–12; J.A. Usher, European Court Practice (1983), at 113–117, 220–223; C. 
Philip, La Cour de Justice des Communautés Européennes (1983), at 12; P. Lasok, European Court of 
Justice: Practice and Procedure (1984), at 66–88; Darmon, ‘L’avocat devant la Cour de Justice des 
Communautres Européennes’, in M. Schaffer (ed.), L’avocat et l’Europe des 12 et des 21 (1988), at 177; 
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Rules governing lawyers’ professional ethics…vary widely between Member States. 
Moreover, apart from the notes for the guidance of counsel for the parties at the hearing, 
which are intended to ensure the efficient management of court business, there are no 
common rules governing the conduct of lawyers before the Court of Justice and the Court 
of First Instance and it would be invidious for the Court of Justice to attempt such a 
labour of Sisyphus.14  
 
Similarly, Anderson opines: 
[T]here is no code of conduct for lawyers practising before the European Court, whether 
in preliminary reference cases or direct actions. The construction of such a code might 
have advantages but it would be a formidable task, bearing in mind the very different 
traditions from which European advocates, procurators and legal advisers have evolved.15 
 
That the topic has not been researched in more than 50 years of practice is explicable by 
the fact that the Court has never formally invoked its disciplinary powers.16  
The ECSC Court of Justice rules concerning representation were historic in two 
important respects. First, the admission requirements imposed by Article 20 of the ECSC 
Protocol marked the first time that parties’ discretion to appoint counsel was fettered by 
an international court. Contemporary commentaries17 do not explain why the drafters 
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L’observateur de Bruxelles (2003) 21; J. Mouton and C. Soulard, La Cour de justice des Communautés 
Européennes (2004), at 63–64; J. Boudant, La Cour de justice des Communautés Européennes (2005), at 
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and Change in EU Law: Essays in Honour of Sir Francis Jacobs (2008), at 48, 51–54.  
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 L.N. Brown and T. Kennedy, The Court of Justice of the European Communities (2000), at 302–303. 
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 D.W.K. Anderson and M. Demetriou, References to the European Court (2002), at 252 (para. 9-051). 
16
 Letter from the Registrar (22 Oct. 2009), on file with the author. 
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 Delvaux, supra note 10, at 251–313; Reuter, ‘Le Plan Schuman’, 81 Recueil des Cours (1952-II) 523, at 
559–571; P. Reuter, La Communauté Européenne du Charbon et de l’Acier (1953), at 66; Antoine, ‘La 
Cour de Justice de la C.E.C.A. et la Cour internationale de Justice’, 57 RGDIP (1953) 210, at 221, 252–
253; Lagrange, ‘La Cour de Justice de la Communauté Européenne du Charbon et de l’Acier’, 70 Revue du 
Droit Public et de la Science Politique (1954) 417, at 433; Jeantet, ‘Les intérêts privés devant la Cour de 
Justice de la Communauté Européenne du Charbon et de l’Acier’, 70 Revue du Droit Public et de la 
Science Politique (1954) 684, at 709; D.G. Valentine, The Court of Justice of the European Coal and Steel 
Community (1955), at 149–151; van Houtte, ‘La Cour de Justice de la Communauté Européenne du 
Charbon et de l’Acier’, II Annuaire Européen (1956) 183; Robertson, ‘Legal Problems of European 
Integration’, 91(I) Recueil des Cours (1957) 105, at 149–153; C. van Reepinghen and P. Orianne, La 
procedure devant la Cour de justice des communautés européennes (1961), at 26–27; R. Schuman, Pour 
l’Europe (1963), at 151–176; J. Monnet, Mémoires (1976), at 318–335; Lagrange, ‘La Cour de Justice des 
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departed from the ICJ policy permitting parties absolute control over representation.18 
Secondly, Article 6 of the ECSC Supplementary Rules19 for the first time vested an 
international court with the power to exclude counsel from proceedings for ‘behaviour 
incompatible with the dignity of the Court’.20 Contemporary works do not explain the 
rationale for this power.21  
Concerning ECJ procedure, four important factors should be explained. First, the 
Court unusually lacks control over its own procedural rules. 22 While the ECSC Court of 
Justice was vested with the power to frame its Rules,23 the EEC Treaty required the CJEU 
to obtain the approval of the EU Council.24 Although the CJEU can request amendment 
of its Statute, its consent is not required.25 In light of an increasing caseload, the CJEU 
has proposed amendments to its Statute as well as a new set of Rules.26 Secondly, the 
CJEU is not confined to one or two official languages. While the sole authentic language 
of the ECSC Protocol and Rules of Procedure was French,27 the four languages of ‘the 
original Six’ were authentic languages of the ECJ Statute.28  
 Thirdly, there are important architectural differences among the legal professions 
of the Member States. For example, the functional meaning of an avocat within Article 
19 of the Statute derives from French civil procedure. Thus, linguistic differences in the 
texts should be overlaid with civil procedural distinctions. Fourthly, the Court’s 
jurisdiction (consisting of direct actions and preliminary references) is principally review-
based.29 Direct actions are subdivided into actions between institutions and Member 
                                                                                                                                                 
Communautés Européennes: du Plan Schuman à l’union Européenne’, Revue Trimistrielle de Droit 
Européenne (1978) 2.  
18
 S. Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the International Courts 1920–2005 (2006), iii, at 1133. An 
indirect link to the Nuremberg Tribunal may have existed through Professor André Gros. See Art. 32, 
Charter of the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal and Art. 20, ECSC Protocol.  
19
 Art. 35(1), Rules of Procedure of the European Court of Justice, OJ (2010) C117/1 (‘ECJ Rules’). 
20
  Art. 20, ECSC Protocol. See also Delvaux, supra note 10, at 310. 
21
 Delvaux, supra note 10, at 50–51. See also Riese, supra note 11, at 521–525. 
22
 Art. 253 TFEU.  
23
 Art. 44 ECSC Treaty. 
24
 Art. 188 EEC Treaty. 
25
 Art. 281 TFEU. See also Rodríguez Iglesias, ‘Réformer la Cour de justice européenne’, Le Monde, 28 
April 2000. 
26
 ‘Draft CJEU Amendments to the Statute’ (28 Mar. 2011) and ‘Draft ECJ Rules of Procedure’ (25 May 
2011), available at: http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_7031/ (accessed 23 Feb. 2012). 
27
 Art. 100 ECSC Treaty. Cf. Art. 27(1) ECSC Rules. 
28
 Art. 248 EEC Treaty. See also Art. 29(1) ECJ Rules. 
29
 Arts 263, 267–268, 270 TFEU. 
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States and actions between individuals and institutions.30 Since ‘staff cases’ are now 
delegated to the EU Civil Service Tribunal,31 evidence is rare.32  
Although the travaux préparatoires of the ECHR are published,33 those of the 
ECtHR Rules of Procedure are not, and the scholarship does not discuss the professional 
ethics of counsel.34 Since the advent of rights of litigation for applicants in 1998, the 
Court’s most pressing problems have included its backlog of applications and uneven 
state compliance with its judgments. Insufficient resources amid expanding membership 
and a low application threshold have also contributed to the backlog even while 
efficiency reforms have doubled the Court’s productivity.35  
The role of counsel before the ECtHR has historically been connected to the 
filtering of applications. During the ECHR negotiations,36 it was proposed that applicants 
be required to present petitions through counsel for ‘purely practical [reasons]…to 
facilitate the work of the Commission…by excluding appeals, as it were, through the 
obligation to make use of the services of a barrister or a jurisconsult’.37 This proposal was 
adopted at the committee stage but redacted in plenary and left to the Commission.38  
Due to the ban upon rights of litigation for applicants until 1997,39 the 
Commission was compelled to adopt a dual role as an ‘objective and impartial’ fact-
                                                 
30
 Art. 63 ECJ Statute; Art. 104 ECJ Rules.  
31
 Art. 257 TFEU. See also Council Dec. of 2 Nov. 2004, OJ (2004) L333/1. 
32
 However, the Court can re-examine factual issues in referral cases: Interview with President Eric Jaeger, 
Judge Nicholas Forwood, and Registrar Emmanuel Coulon (14 Oct. 2010), cited with permission.  
33
 Collected Edition of the Travaux Préparatoires (1975). 
34
 A. Robertson, The Law of International Institutions in Europe (1961); Mosler, ‘The Protection of Human 
Rights by International Legal Procedure’, 52 Georgetown LJl (1964) 800; F. Monconduit, La Commission 
Européenne des Droits de l’Homme (1965); Krüger, ‘The European Commission of Human Rights’, 
Human Rts LJ (1980) 66; L. Mikaelsen, European Protection of Human Rights (1980), at 38–59; Mahoney, 
‘Developments in the Procedure of the European Court of Human Rights: the Revised Rules of Court’, 3 
Yrbk European L (1984) 127, at 128–134; Eissen, ‘L’avocat devant la Cour européenne des Droits de 
l’Homme’, in F. Matscher and H. Petzold (eds), Protecting Human Rights: The European Dimension 
(1988), at 159; O’Boyle, ‘Procedure before the European Court of Human Rights’, 2 All-European Human 
Rts Yrbk (1992) 93, at 102–103; Konstantinov, ‘Procedure of the New Permanent European Court of 
Human Rights’, 3 E European Human Rts Rev (1997) 101, at 114; P. Leach, Taking a Case to the 
European Court of Human Rights (2005); Chavrier, ‘L’avocat devant les jurisdictions européennes’, 52 
L’observateur de Bruxelles (2003) 21, at 27–28; K. Reid, A Practitioner’s Guide to the European 
Convention on Human Rights (2008), at 21–23; Lambert, ‘L’avocat devant la Cour européenne des droits 
de l’homme’, in R. Badinter (ed.), Liber Amicorum Jean-Pierre Cot: le procès international (2009), at 171. 
35
 D. Shelton, The Regional Protection of Human Rights (2008), at 493–497, 1013–1023. 
36
 Travaux Préparatoires, supra note 33, i, at 154. 
37
 Ibid. , vi, at 34 (Doc. A 2299), 170–171.   
38
 Ibid., 38–40, 64 (para. 6), 98, 166–172. 
39
 Ibid., vii, at 172. See also Arts 44, 48 ECHR.  
 7
finding body on the one hand and as the indirect representative of the applicant before the 
Court on the other. 40 Following the Vagrants case,41 this problem was partially solved in 
1983 when applicants’ counsel gained rights of hearing under the supervision of the 
Commission.42 However, compulsory representation remained desirable ‘as a precaution 
to prevent abuse and to ensure a proper administration of justice’.  
Given certain negative experiences involving vexatious petitions,43 offensive 
language,44 baseless accusations,45 and misrepresentations,46 compulsory representation 
at point of application may be a useful filtering mechanism. However, vulnerable 
applicants (e.g., prisoners) may struggle to retain counsel: 
´There are three filtering ideas being considered now: 1) applications to be drafted in one 
of the official languages; 2) an application fee; and 3) compulsory professional 
representation…[t]he problem with imposing the professional representation option is 
that a legal aid system at that stage would be required, for which there is little funding at 
the moment…[c]urrently the filtering costs are borne by the Court and the financial case 
would need to be made that requiring applicants to engage a lawyer would be more 
effective.´47 
 
One way to address the financial difficulty of creating a legal aid system may be to make 
discretionary exceptions for vulnerable applicants who would have difficulty retaining 
professional counsel such as prisoners, residents in war zones, or the indigent.  
 
2   Qualification Requirements 
This section examines the qualification requirements laid down by the Courts to regulate 
the admission of representatives. In principle, such requirements entail reduced access to 
                                                 
40
 Mahoney, supra note 34, at 128–129. 
41
 De Wilde, Ooms and Versip v. Belgium (Questions of Procedure)(No 1) (1971),  1 EHRR (373. 
42
 Mahoney, supra note 34, at 130–134. 
43
 M v. UK (1987), 54 DR 214. 
44
 Varbanov v. Bulgaria ECHR (2000) 457, at paras 36, 63–66; App. No. 46488/99, Manoussos v. Czech 
Republic, 9 July 2002, at 20–21; App. No0. 32438/96, I.S. v. Bulgaria, 6 Apr. 2000, at 6; Akdivar v. Turkey 
(1997) 23 EHRR 143; Aslan v. Turkey (1995) DR 80A 138; Assenov v. Bulgaria (1996), DR 86-A, 54, at 
68.   
45
 App. Nos. 61164/00 and 18589/02, Duringer and others v. France, 4 Feb. 2003; App. No. 67208/01, 
Řehák v. Czech Republic, 18 May 2004.  
46
 App.No. 46640/99, Jian v. Romania, 30 Mar. 2004; F.M. v. Spain (1991) 69 DR 185, at 194. 
47
 Interview with Ms Clare Ovey, 15 Oct. 2010, cited with permission. 
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courts and higher litigation costs for litigants in exchange for professional standards of 
competence and integrity. In comparing the European Courts, the first issue common to 
both is the lack of such requirements for agents. The second, specific to the CJEU, is the 
definition of the term ‘lawyer’. The third, specific to the ECtHR, is the idea that 
applicants be represented by counsel from the application stage as a filtering mechanism. 
Minor issues not addressed in this article include the lack of requirements of specialist 
expertise and advocacy experience for lawyers and the admission of academics.    
 
A   Agents  
Representation of litigants before the CJEU is governed by Article 19 of the Statute.48 
Under Article 19, advocacy is bifurcated between states and EU organs (‘privileged 
parties’) and individuals and companies (‘unprivileged parties’). Whereas the former 
must be represented by ‘an agent appointed for each case’, the latter must be represented 
by ‘a lawyer authorised to practise before a Court of a Member State’.49   
 In practice, agents are usually in-house government lawyers.50 As the UK 
delegation to the CoE Committee of Legal Advisers on Public International Law 
(CAHDI) has noted, there are real questions concerning ‘how effective [their national 
rules] are to control conduct before international courts’.51 The author has been 
confidentially informed that when the EU Civil Service Tribunal drafted its Rules of 
Procedure, it wished to include agents within its disciplinary powers.52 It was required to 
consult the CJEU before submitting them to the Council. The proposal was not adopted. 
The CJEU has not proposed to amend Article 19 it its draft amendments.53 
 As before the CJEU, representation before the ECtHR is bifurcated in that 
individuals are generally required to be represented by counsel whereas the states can be 
                                                 
48
 Originally Art. 20 ECSC Statute. See also Art. 104(2) ECJ Rules. 
49
 Case T–37/98, FTA and Others v. Council [2000] ECR II–00373, Order (24 Feb. 2000), at para. 25. 
Agency, a feature of 19th-century international arbitration, was probably taken from the ICJ Statute: 
Antoine, supra note 17, at 252; de Richemont, supra note 13, at 103. Alternatively, it reflects the role of the 
avocat as an agent empowered to perform procedural acts: Lasok, supra note 13, at 66.  
50
 Ibid., at 70. 
51
 CAHDI, ‘Item 7: Organisation and Functions of the Office of the Legal Adviser of the Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs’ (2006), available at: www.coe.int/t/dlapil/cahdi (accessed: 11 Dec. 2011), at 2 (note 1).  
52
 Arts 31–32 EU Civil Service Tribunal Rules of Procedure 2007, OJ (2007) L225/1.  
53
 Draft ECJ Amendments to the Statute, note 26, supra. Cf. Art. 46 Draft ECJ Rules. 
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represented by agents.54 Following the ICJ55 and ECSC Court of Justice56 practice, the 
states must be represented by agents, assisted by advocates.57 Applicants must generally 
be represented by ‘an advocate authorised to practise in any of the Contracting States…or 
any other person approved by the President of the Chamber’ with ‘an adequate 
understanding of one of the Court’s official languages’.58 The lack of requirements for 
agents may be criticized in light of cases involving questionable conduct.59  
 
B  Lawyers 
The phrase ‘lawyer authorised to practise before the Court of a Member State’ in Article 
19 was a translation done upon the accession of the UK and Ireland in 1973. While the 
General Court has construed two discrete requirements,60 the textual history suggests that 
it should be read as a definition. The original phrase avocats inscrit à un barreau was 
clearly understood in Continental jurisdictions as membership of a bar providing the right 
to perform procedural acts. In the translation, ‘lawyers’ was shorthand for ‘advocates, 
barristers and solicitors’, and the qualifier ‘authorised to practise before the Court of a 
Member State’ was intended to exclude ‘non-practising’61 professionals. Thus, Article 19 
should have been better translated as ‘practising advocates, barristers and solicitors’.62 
Following the Agreement on the European Economic Area 1994, all of the 
versions were amended to conform linguistically to the English.63  The original definition 
avocats inscrit à un barreau was replaced with avocats habilité à exercer devant une 
jurisdiction d’un État Membre, compounding the ambiguity introduced by the poor 
                                                 
54
 Rules 35–36 ECtHR Rules of Procedure (1 Feb. 2012)(‘ECtHR Rules’).  
55
 Mosler, ‘La procédure de la Cour Internationale de Justice et de la Cour Européenne des Droits de 
l’Homme’, in R. Cassin, René Cassin Amicorum Discipulorumque Liber I: Problèmes de protection 
internationale des droits de l’homme (1969), at 196, 197.  
56
 Mahoney, supra note 34, at 127–168, 167. 
57
 Rule 35 ECtHR Rules.  
58
 Rules 36(4)(a), 36(5)(a) ECtHR Rules. 
59
 Supra notes 44–46. 
60
 A person must be: (1) a ‘lawyer’; and (2) ‘authorised to appear before the Court of a Member State’.  
61
 ‘Practising members’ are those licensed to perform ‘reserved legal activities’, such as exercising rights of 
audience: ss. 12(1), 13, 18(1), Sch. 5 (Part 1), Courts and Legal Services Act 2007.  
62
 See Art. 1(2) of Dir. 77/249/EEC,  OJ (1977) L78/1; Art. 1(2) of Dir. 98/5/EC, OJ (1998) L77/1.  
63
 ‘Décision du Conseil, du 22 décembre 1994, modifiant le protocole sur le statut de la Cour de justice des 
Communautés européennes’ (94/993/CE), OJ (1994) L379/1.  
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translation into English. Nevertheless, the old definition has apparently been retained in 
denying patent attorneys admission in their own right in intellectual property cases.64  
Although there is no express textual basis, the General Court’s jurisprudence 
concerning Article 19 suggests that ‘professional ethics and discipline’ and 
‘independence’ are key to its definition of a ‘lawyer’. It has consistently cited the 
A.M.&S. Europe case that ‘the requirements as to the position and status as an 
independent lawyer…is based on a conception of the lawyer’s role as collaborating in the 
administration of justice by the courts and as being required to provide, in full 
independence, and in the overriding interests of that cause, such legal assistance as the 
client needs’.65 Although the CJEU based its decision in that case on EU ‘common legal 
principles’,66 its citation of Article 19 implicitly excluded employed lawyers.67  
 In Akzo Nobel, the General Court applied A.M.&S. that communications with an 
employed lawyer were not legally confidential.68 The Grand Chamber upheld the 
decision, holding that there was no ‘predominant trend’ among the Member States to 
justify a change.69 It went further in finding that an employed lawyer lacks independence 
because he cannot ignore his employer’s commercial strategies. It is unclear whether the 
General Court excludes employed lawyers and  it is not always possible to detect them in 
practice.70 In Endesa, the Court reportedly instructed an employed lawyer to withdraw.71  
 
2  Ethical Standards 
In comparing the professional conduct of counsel before the CJEU and ECtHR, two 
general observations may be made. First, professional misconduct is a more pressing 
                                                 
64
 See Case T–14/04, Alto de Casablanca, SA v. OHIM [2005] ETMR 71, at paras 7–12; Case T–315/03 
Wilfer v. OHIM, Judgment of 8 June 2005, at para. 11; Case C–363/06 P, Comunidad Autónoma de 
Valencia v. Comisión, Auto del Tribunal de Justicia, 20 Feb. 2008, at para. 12 (sub-paras 10–11); Case T–
487/07, Imperial Chemical Industries Plc v. OHIM, Order of 20 Oct. 2008, at paras 11–12, 19–28; Case T–
472/07, Enercon GmbH v. OHIM, Judgment of 3 Feb. 2010. 
65
 Case 155/79, A.M. & S. Europe Ltd v. Commission [1983] QB 878, at 950 (paras 24, 26). 
66
 Ibid., at 949 (para. 21) and 951 (paras 26–27). Cf. the opinion of A-G Sir Gordon Slynn.  
67
 Usher, supra note 13, at 216; Brown and Kennedy, supra note 14, at 304–305. 
68
 Cases T–125/03 & 253/03, Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd and Another v. Commission, Judgment of 17 Sept. 
2007, at paras 168–170. 
69
 Case 550/07 P, Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd and Another v. Commission, Judgment of 14 Sept. 2010, at 
paras 32, 40–51, 65–76. 
70
 Registrar Coulon, Interview, supra note 32. 
71
 Ibid.. There is no express reference in the judgment: Case T–417/05, Endesa, SA v. Commission, 
Judgment of 14 July 2006, at paras 34–48. 
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issue before the ECtHR than the CJEU. This may be attributed to two key differences in 
their respective jurisdictions: (1) the membership of the Council of Europe is far larger 
than that of the EU, resulting in even greater divergences in standards; and 2) the CJEU 
jurisdiction is considerably narrower than that of the ECtHR and mostly excludes factual 
issues, restricting the scope for counsel to misbehave. Secondly, while the frequency of 
misconduct is greater before the ECtHR than the CJEU several of the same issues apply 
to both Courts (e.g., conflicts of interest and misleading the Court).  
The CJEU Statute, Rules of Procedure, and ‘Notes for the Guidance of Counsel’ 
(originally created for oral hearings only72) do not address professional conduct by 
counsel. While Brown and Kennedgy cite the Council of Bars and Law Societies of 
Europe Code of Conduct 1988 (CCBE Code),73 it is inapplicable to CJEU proceedings 
because it was expressly designed for transnational practice74 rather than international 
courts. While counsel are presumably bound by their national standards,75 national bars 
are unlikely to apply them to international litigation. The English Bar – one of the few to 
have provided for such enforcement – has never held disciplinary proceedings concerning 
counsel’s misconduct before an international court.76  
The CJEU has never invoked its disciplinary powers concerning lawyers, with 
such matters being dealt with on an ad hoc basis:  
Only if real problems arise, would a real incentive be provided to justify the intellectual 
effort and energy required to draft a comprehensive code of conduct. That said, [there 
are] some particular issues which are problems that, if they have not already arisen, may 
do so in the future. Confidentiality issues particularly come to mind in the context of 
counsel passing on to their client confidential material made available to him by to the 
Court on a restrictive basis.77 
 
                                                 
72
 Usher, supra note 13, at 233. 
73
 Supra note 14, at 302 (note 14).  
74
 Arts 1, 3.1 CCBE Code.  
75
 E.g., Code of Conduct of the Bar of England and Wales 2004 (‘English Code’), Annexe A (‘International 
Practice Rules’); Recueil des Règles Professionnelles du Barreau de Bruxelles (‘Brussels Code’), 
Règlement Intérieur du Barreau de Paris (‘Paris Code’); Federal Republic of Germany Assembly of 
Rechstanwälte Rules of Professional Practice (1 Mar. 2010). 
76
 Email from Ms Sara Down, Bar Standards Board (9 July 2010), on file with author. 
77
 Interview with Judge Forwood, supra 
 12
Three reasons for the rarity of ethical issues may be suggested: (1) the narrow, review-
based jurisdiction of the Court excluding evidentiary matters; (2) the small number of 
regular practitioners before the Court; and (3) the relative procedural homogeneity of the 
‘original Six’ jurisdictions. With membership expansion, ethical standards are 
consequently more relative including formerly authoritarian jurisdictions with limited 
experience of independent bars. The dormancy of the Court’s disciplinary jurisdiction 
may also be attributable to the absence of a clear textual framework.  
Like the CJEU, the ECtHR lacks prescribed ethical standards for counsel though 
it has recently prescribed judicial standards.78 According to an architect of those 
standards: 
For me, having a code of conduct is as much a question of appearances to the outside 
world as it is a question of practice. It is difficult to explain to the outside world why we 
have ethics for judges, doctors, politicians and even for companies but we do not need 
them for counsel. Also, can we as a Court honestly say that we are so much better that we 
are not ourselves subject to temptations or to difficulties?...[w]hen you get into the 
details, you realise that things are more complex than they may at first appear. Another 
aspect is that a code of conduct, backed by disciplinary sanctions, clearly has a deterrent 
effect upon bad behaviour. Who knows what might happen? Everyone can fail and 
everyone can make mistakes. It would be naïve, or even foolish, to say ‘don’t do anything 
because nothing has happened yet’. It would be better to already have rules ready in such 
a situation than to have to invent rules on the spot to deal with it once it has already 
occurred.79 
 
Thus, ethical standards can be useful not only to address existing problems but also to 
pre-empt potential problems and promote institutional legitimacy. Such issues may be 
simple yet important, as when counsel makes an urgent application for interim measures 
in a torture case but is unavailable to be contacted by the Court, fails to notify the Court 
that he is no longer representing a client, or uses intemperate language.80 Ethical 
standards can be a particularly useful shield for junior counsel against client pressure: 
                                                 
78
 ‘Resolution on Judicial Ethics’ 2008, available at: http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/1F0376F2-
01FE-4971-9C54-EBC7D0DD2B77/0/Resolution_on_Judicial_Ethics.pdf (accessed 7 Feb. 2011). 
79
 Interview with Judge Elisabet Fura (15 Oct. 2010), cited with permission. 
80
 Ibid. 
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[T]his is something that I as a former practising lawyer can detect in observing the 
demeanour of counsel and client from the Bench. For example, colleagues of mine who 
say ‘why did that counsel make such a silly point?’ who have not been practising lawyers 
having to deal with clients in the past have not observed that it was because of the client 
that the lawyer had to say that. For a junior counsel, it can often be very difficult to deal 
with this and there will be all sorts of reasons why, such as age difference, client literacy, 
dealing with government officials as clients and so on. A senior counsel will find it 
easier, though problems will still arise for them too. They arise for judges. For example, 
during the drafting of the Resolution the point was made that ‘one day, one of us will 
have problems and we will need to refer to the Resolution to support us’.81 
 
The authority of counsel towards his client varies considerably, and it is counsel who will 
face pressure from his client or others to commit misconduct threatening procedural 
integrity.  
 
A  Duties to the Client 
1.   Conflicts of interest 
There are neither procedural rules nor precedents prescribing the circumstances in which 
an advocate may (or must) accept a representation agreement or withdraw from one. 
Conflicts of interest are an increasingly important issue before international courts. The 
CJEU has addressed one type of conflict through Article 6(2) of its Code of Conduct 
2007,82 which prohibits judges from, inter alia, acting as representatives of parties for a 
three-year period after their term of office. This is an important issue: 
[The three-year freezing period] is the Court of Justice's considered response to a 
potential problem. Several former Advocates-General, judges and even a President of the 
General Court have subsequently returned to practice and appeared as counsel. This is, 
moreover, a practical issue because EU judges are appointed for only six years or even 
shorter, rather than as a lifetime career, and (particularly if they have been appointed 
early) it would be severe to require them to sacrifice rights of audience permanently in 
the future, upon becoming judges.83   
 
                                                 
81
 Ibid. 
82
 OJ (2007) C223/2. 
83
 Judge Forwood, Interview, supra note 32. 
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As seen below, this problem has also arisen before the ECtHR. It is interesting that the 
freezing period is the same as that of the ICJ, suggesting cross-fertilization. However, 
other important types of conflict (e.g., multiple clients, links with the judiciary, or 
financial interest in litigation84) remain unregulated by the Court. 
Before the ECtHR, there is no rule prohibiting judges from serving as counsel 
following their term of office. However, the author is confidentially aware of a pending 
case in which a former judge (Loukis Loucaides of Cyprus) sought to appear as counsel. 
While the application of the Court’s power to exclude counsel was seriously considered, 
the problem was ultimately resolved when, after being approached, the advocate 
voluntarily withdrew. Since the average age of Strasbourg judges, like Luxembourg 
judges, is relatively low compared with those of other courts like the ICJ, there would 
appear to be a need for normativity concerning the apparent conflict of a former judge or 
registrar acting as counsel before his past colleagues. The inclusion of a ‘freezing 
period’85 for such persons would be a useful precaution against allegations of bias or 
unfairness. 
Another interesting ECtHR issue, particularly affecting human rights 
organizations, is a conflict between the duty of loyalty to an individual client and a wider 
campaign interest for human rights standards. For example, in Roma, Chechen, and 
Kurdish cases the applicants’ circumstances are such that the applications are propelled 
more by the lawyers than by the applicants. While this means that vulnerable applicants 
receive an opportunity to seek a remedy, the question arises how far the lawyers can go in 
pushing the ‘background interest’ of human rights campaigning. 
According to a confidential source, in the Tahsin Acar case86 (a Kurdish case) the 
applicant did not accept a very substantial offer from the respondent in friendly 
settlement negotiations.87 The Grand Chamber ruled that the ‘unilateral declaration’ 
should not be imposed upon the applicant, but in the end the Court found only minor 
violations. There are two possibilities from this: (1) the applicant did not want the 
settlement offer; or (2) the lawyer convinced the client to reject it. One can only speculate 
                                                 
84
 Principle 4, Hague Principles. 
85
 Principle 4.3.4, Hague Principles. 
86
 App. No. 26307/95, Tahsin Acar v. Turkey, Judgment of 8 Apr. 2004. 
87
 Ibid., at paras 21–26. 
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whether the ‘background interest’ played a role. Although the human rights organizations 
have brought cases that would otherwise never have come to the Court, in certain cases 
they may detrimentally affect individual applicants’ interests in pushing a wider doctrinal 
interest.  
 
2.  Client confidentiality 
Confidentiality between lawyer and client, a shared issue before both European Courts, 
has both legal and ethical dimensions. The legal aspect ensures that third parties may not 
generally view such confidential communications without client consent. The ethical 
aspect encourages trust between lawyer and client. However, legal protection from 
outside scrutiny creates a danger of abuse. Safeguards include a judicial power to view 
confidential communications88 and an ethical duty for counsel to disclose in abusive 
circumstances. De Richemont’s commentary explains that this rule protects the cabinet 
d’avocat except where a delict (e.g., a false pleading) has been committed.89  
 Consequently, the legal protection of confidential or privileged material is 
qualified. In commenting that justice may demand the disclosure of material comprising a 
delict, de Richemont probably intended that it would be for the Court to order90 rather 
than for the advocate to disclose ex proprio motu. This is supported by Article 34 of the 
Rules (originally Article 3(1)(2) of the ECSC Supplementary Rules) providing:  
The privileges…specified in Article 32 of these Rules are granted exclusively in the 
interests of the proper conduct of proceedings. The Court may waive the immunity where 
it considers that the proper conduct of proceedings will not be hindered thereby.  
 
De Richemont commented that party independence is subject to interest of procedural 
harmony and does not extend to defamatory statements or other serious misconduct.91  
Applying this reasoning, the Court may order disclosure of confidential material 
where there appears to be a serious threat to procedural integrity. Since the advocate is 
the only person other than the client (who is unlikely to disclose his own wrongdoing) 
privy to the threat, an ethical duty to alert the Court where there is reasonable suspicion 
                                                 
88
 Art. 32(2)(a) ECJ Rules.,originally Art. 1(2)(a) ECSC Supplementary Rules.   
89
 Supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 105-2. 
90
 Art. 24 ECJ Statute; Art. 57, CJEU Rules; Art. 48(1), ECSC Rules. 
91
 De Richemont, supra note 13, at 105–108. 
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of misconduct would provide a useful safeguard. An advocate ought not to be suborned 
into protecting a client who seeks to corrupt the proceedings.  
As explained above, the ‘independence’ of the lawyer from the client was crucial 
to the A.M.&S. Europe and Akso Nobel judgments. Those cases illustrate by analogy the 
problem of divergent ethical standards within the context of potential client misconduct 
being shielded by the confidentiality principle. The need for a general, rather than 
absolute, ethical duty of confidentiality would strike a balance between the competing 
priorities of lawyer–client trust and the integrity of judicial proceedings. The Hague 
Principles, which authorize counsel to disclose confidential information only where the 
rules of the international court permit,92 do not adequately address this issue. 
 
B  Duties to the Court 
1.  Misleading the Court 
A universal issue before international courts, including both European Courts, concerns 
the exact standard by which counsel ‘misleads the court’ through legal or factual 
assertions that counsel ‘knows’ to be false. In the List D93 case, Greece asserted that a 
pre-accession system of import authorization was abolished. However, the CJEU found: 
The Hellenic Republic has not produced any instrument providing for the abolition of 
that system…the Commission has produced to the Court photocopies of the two import 
application forms… [o]n each form the refusal of the application is hand-written, 
accompanied by the Greek letter ‘D’, also hand-written…the fact that the refusal of the 
application was accompanied by the letter ‘D’ proves the continued existence of a so-
called ‘List D’…system…In the absence of any other convincing explanation from the 
Government of the Hellenic Republic it must therefore be concluded that there was in 
existence in that State a ‘Procedure D’.94  
 
The agent’s failure to adduce any documentary evidence to sustain her assertion begs the 
question whether she decided against adducing such evidence because, like the 
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 Principle 3.4, Hague Principles. 
93
 Case C–65/91, Commission v Hellenic Republic [1992] ECR I–05245. 
94
 Ibid., at paras 6–10. 
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Commission’s evidence, it was adverse to her argument.95 This example gives rise to the 
question of the exact standard of ‘knowledge’ by which counsel ‘misleads’ the Court.   
While the client in such cases bears the consequences of engaging poor counsel or 
insisting upon bringing a bad case, the Court is also affected. An ‘independent’ advocate 
should not compromise his professional standards to please his client. An example of this 
is the Koelman case,96 concerning which the author is aware on a confidential basis that 
the applicant was nominally represented by a Luxembourgeois avocat who, in order to 
comply with a filing deadline, signed pleadings that the applicant had himself drafted. 
The advocate subsequently refused to answer questions put by the Court at the oral 
hearing, apparently because he was unfamiliar with the pleadings.97  
Before the ECtHR, Rule 44D98 prescribes broad principles of courtesy, honesty, 
and competence in counsel’s relations with the Court. In light of certain negative 
experiences concerning abusive submissions,99 the addition of this provision in 2004 is 
understandable and demonstrates a need for common and rigorous ethical standards.100 In 
the Foxley case, the applicant’s representative, who was alleged to have had prior 
convictions for perjury and perverting the course of justice, was found to have attempted 
to mislead the Court by clumsily forging letters by the Commission.101 There is an 
argument for sanctioning representatives who collaborate with clients to conceal 
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 There is a division between, sensu lato, ‘common law’ and ‘civil law’ procedures though there are also 
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evidence.102 A particular problem concerning applicants entails attempts to mislead by 
not informing the Court of compensatory payments made by Respondents.103  
 The backlog at the Court also creates a particular challenge for applicants’ 
advocates who should be ethically obliged to protect the Court from frivolous cases while 
advancing meritorious ones. Respondents’ advocates, particularly those appearing for 
states facing many applications, may face pressure to contest every case regardless of 
merits. The disparity in volume of pending cases from state to state is striking: 
For the UK, there are some 4000 cases pending…Russia has some 30000 cases pending. 
The Court’s policy changed from chronological handling to prioritisation on the basis of 
urgency and importance, as we used to deal with cases indiscriminately as they came in. 
Now, the main problem with the docket is simply the volume of cases. It should be said 
that right across the Court, regardless of Respondent, around 90% of applications are 
filtered as inadmissible.104  
 
While compulsory professional representation is a potential safeguard against abusive 
applications, ethical standards are helpful for advocates to resist client pressure.105  
 While the danger of counsel misleading the court is clearly greater before the 
ECtHR than the CJEU due to its more factually intensive jurisdiction and the even greater 
diversity of membership, the issues that arise in practice are similar. Apart from asserting 
facts that counsel actually knows to be false, there are the grey areas of suppressing or 
failing to disclose adverse evidence and making unsupported factual assertions. Not only 
do these practices endanger judicial integrity but they can also result in a waste of judicial 
resources on factual matters that could be properly agreed. The Hague Principles propose 
a vague standard of ‘reasonableness’106 that does not address these problems.  
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IV), at 1507, 1530. 
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 See, e.g., App. No. 5667/02, Kérétchachvili v. Georgia, Decision (2 May 2006); App. Nos 33052/05 & 
31404/05, Lozinschi and Rujavnita v. Moldova, Decision of 4 Nov. 2008; App. Nos 41369/05, etc., Sumila 
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2.  Documentary evidence 
Since the procedure of both European Courts is weighted towards written pleadings and 
documentary evidence, their handling by counsel is an important issue for both. While 
the ECJ’s review-based jurisdiction generally excludes factual matters, the rarity of oral 
evidence means that where they do arise the integrity of the proceedings relies heavily 
upon the credibility of documentary evidence.107 The ethical dimension concerns the 
adducing of false documents by counsel, which has occurred before several international 
courts.108 In particular, whether counsel should merely refrain from intentionally 
adducing false documents or he should take steps to verify authenticity.  
In Società Italiana Vetro,109 the General Court found that certain relevant 
passages were deliberately deleted without objectively justifiable reason that changed 
completely the tenor of the document.110 The Commission was ‘represented’ as agents by 
two members of its Legal Service who were ‘assisted’ by an Italian avvocato and a 
French avocat. In the absence of prescribed common standards, it is unclear whether the 
alteration of the documents would have been unethical.111 Another problem arose in the 
BP Chemicals case,112 in which certain documents submitted by the Commission were 
seemingly reconstructed from memory.113 This appears to have been a failure by the legal 
team to scrutinize the documents prepared by the case team.  
Before the ECtHR, there is no specific provision addressing the veracity of 
documentary evidence.114 The Court has experienced dubious documentary evidence, as 
in Foxley discussed above.115 Although an advocate who knowingly adduces false 
documents would presumably commit misconduct, it is less clear whether a failure to 
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disclose the existence of probative documents or to take steps to verify the authenticity of 
documents in circumstances where he could be reasonably expected to have doubts 
would be sanctioned.  
In light of the importance of written pleadings, safeguards certifying the veracity 
of documents are critical to both Courts’ procedural integrity. Ethical standards requiring 
counsel not only to refrain from submitting documents that he actually knows to be false 
but also actively to take steps to certify the authenticity of documents could be a useful 
safeguard. While Principle 6.1 of the Hague Principles requires counsel to ‘refrain from 
presenting or otherwise relying upon evidence that he or she knows or has reason to 
believe to be false or misleading’, this arguably places the bar too low by catching actions 
but not omissions. However, failures to take steps to verify documents could infringe an 
ethical duty of diligence.116   
 
3.  Testimonial evidence 
Testimonial evidence is very rare before both European Courts. At the CJEU,117 it 
principally arises in staff cases118 now delegated to the Civil Service Tribunal. Although 
it arises more frequently before the ECtHR, it is not common.119 Although the principal 
reason for this rarity is both Courts’ reliance upon documents in keeping with the written 
Continental tradition, the unfamiliarity of many of the judges and counsel at both Courts 
with the handling of witnesses is also a factor. The European Courts’ procedures are 
relatively vague120 and lack many of the safeguards for the interrogation of witnesses 
known to the common law tradition.  
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There are no CJEU rules concerning witness statements or interrogation 
procedure.121 Although these matters are not addressed in much of the English 
literature,122 Usher writes:  
Since all witnesses are ultimately called by the Court on matters decided by the Court, 
distinctions known to common lawyers between witnesses called by one side or the other 
are not recognised. In particular…there is no real distinction between examination-in-
chief and cross-examination, and no prohibition upon leading witnesses.123 
 
Also, Brown and Kennedy observe: 
The taking of evidence from a witness conforms, for the most part, with the normal 
practice of continental courts – practice which common lawyers generally regard as much 
inferior to their own for the establishment of facts where this depends on the credibility 
of a witness…[t]he witness is heard by the Court in the presence of the parties or their 
representatives. After the witness has given his or her evidence, questions may be put to 
the witness by the presiding judge, the other judges or the advocate general...the different 
context of the Luxembourg [cross-examination] makes it no more than a pale shadow of 
the English original.124 
 
They cite a case in which ‘[t]he parties were each represented by distinguished leading 
counsel from the English bar who were repeatedly admonished by the presiding judge for 
attempting to turn the inquisitorial hearing of witnesses into an adversarial trial’.125  
According to a barrister who appeared in that case, the incident was minor in that counsel 
for both sides had wished to cross-examine witnesses but were instructed by the President 
that, as those witnesses were ‘the Court’s witnesses’, they must be examined through the 
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Court.126 The interrogations ‘came off in a similar way to a normal cross-examination, in 
that the same progress was made but in a less confrontational manner’.127  
 While the distinction between witnesses called by parties and those called by the 
Court may be technically correct, it is an unsatisfactory rationale. Instead of the 
technicality of calling witnesses, a more compelling explanation for the Court’s relaxed 
rules of witness examination is historical, in that there were no common law members of 
the ‘original Six’. Naturally, the protagonists drew upon their own national practices as 
well as the laissez-faire regime of the ICJ in shaping the Court’s early procedure. 
However, like all international courts the CJEU is far removed from the vicinity of the 
disputed facts.  
While the European Courts are vested with certain powers to collect evidence,128 
in practice the parties have readier access to witnesses and, unlike in civil law 
jurisdictions, counsel are not excluded from the evidentiary process. This justifies the 
inclusion of common law standards designed to protect procedural integrity from 
inappropriate advocacy such as pre-testimonial communication, communication with 
witnesses under oath, preparation of witness statements, and interrogation technique (e.g.,  
‘leading’ questions and impugning the credibility of a witness). Although Principle 6.2 of 
the Hague Principles cautiously permits the controversial American practice of ‘witness 
proofing’, Principle 6.3 merely requires counsel ‘to comply with the procedural rules of 
international court or tribunal when presenting evidence’. More detailed ethical standards 
for counsel designed to protect the integrity of testimonial evidence would be a useful 
addition to the European Courts’ procedural rules to provide tighter safeguards for the 
hearing of witnesses.  
 
4.  Judicial orders  
An issue that has arisen in ECtHR proceedings, though not before the CJEU, has been the 
infringement of judicial confidentiality orders.129 In Popov130 the (represented) applicant 
revealed the substance of friendly-settlement negotiations to the Court, alleging that 
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Moldova had attempted to coerce the applicant into a settlement. The respondent 
countered that the applicant’s assertion was ‘offensive and defamatory’ and an ‘abuse of 
process’. In F.M. v. Spain,131 the Commission had occasion to investigate whether a 
Spanish abogado violated the confidentiality of its proceedings by speaking with Spanish 
media. While it found that the press had obtained confidential information, it did not have 
conclusive evidence that the representative was responsible.132  
In B. and P.,133 the principal issue was whether the presumption in English law 
that confidential proceedings concerning children violated fathers’ fair trial rights. The 
Vice-President’s order, Mr Andrew McFarlane QC for the first applicant, and the self-
represented second applicant referred to the full names of the applicants, their former 
partners, and their children.134 This case preceded Rules 44A and 44D and the Court took 
no disciplinary measures. While it is uncontroversial that an advocate who breaches 
Court confidentiality acts unethically, it is less clear whether the advocate should be 
required to take steps to prevent his client from breaching confidentiality. Principle 5.1 of 
the Hague Principles requires counsel ‘to abide by the rules of conduct, orders and 
directions of the international court or tribunal’. 
 
5.  Courtesy  
The observance of decorum and courtesy towards the Court, the parties, witnesses, and 
other counsel is an uncontroversial ethical principle that is nevertheless vital for ensuring 
the smooth and efficient conduct of judicial proceedings. However, different standards of 
courtesy are observed in national jurisdictions and rude behaviour is not unheard-of 
before international courts. While a rare problem before the CJEU, one senior English 
counsel has confidentially related a case in which he was accused of dishonesty by a 
German opposing counsel. Although he was instructed by the British judge to withdraw 
his unsupported accusation,135 the other judges did not consider the matter to be serious.    
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Rudeness by counsel towards opposing parties and their representation has been 
more frequent before the ECtHR.136 Apart from a reference to ‘abusive submissions’ in 
Rule 44D137 there are no specific procedural rules concerning decorum. Although overt 
insults by counsel would presumably constitute misconduct, matters like ‘impeaching the 
credibility of a witness’ or accusing other counsel of dishonesty are more complex. In 
addition, there is a need for a professional duty of cooperation to promote orderly and 
expeditious proceedings. The lack of detailed rules in such situations renders it difficult 
to draw the line between zealous advocacy and professional misconduct. Principle 7.1 of 
the Hague Principles requires counsel to treat one another and others with ‘due respect, 
courtesy and dignity’. Principle 7.2 goes further in requiring counsel to use ‘best 
endeavours to cooperate effectively with each other’. While these provisions are 
straightforward, unsupported accusations of misconduct should also be forbidden.  
 
3  Disciplinary Jurisdiction 
While both European Courts have prescribed disciplinary powers concerning counsel,138 
they have never been exercised by the CJEU and are rarely invoked by the ECtHR. The 
CJEU is empowered to inform national bars or exclude lawyers for conduct 
‘incompatible with the dignity of the Court or with the requirements of the proper 
administration of justice’ following a hearing of the impugned counsel. However, the 
omission of agents from this jurisdiction is questionable in light of cases such as List D 
and Società Italiana Vetro.139 While the Court has issued costs orders to parties,140 it may 
not have the power to issue costs orders to counsel141 for wasteful or abusive 
pleadings.142 
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The ECtHR has only prescribed for itself the power to exclude. Rules 36(4)(b) 
and 44D143 empower the President of the Chamber to exclude applicants’ advocates ‘in 
exceptional circumstances’ or ‘the representative of a party’ who makes ‘abusive, 
vexatious, misleading or prolix submissions’. The Rule 44D reference to 
‘representatives’, in contrast to the Rule 36 reference to ‘advocates’, suggests that the 
power applies also to agents. The Court has exercised these powers rarely.144  
In addition to the problem of articulating common ethical standards for the 
divergent European professions, their enforcement is equally important. In the absence of 
an international bar authority, the Courts themselves are the logical forum to uphold the 
integrity of the common standards. As noted above, the rarity of professional conduct 
issues before the former is the principal reason for the dormancy of its disciplinary 
jurisdiction. However, there are also two important gaps in the disciplinary frameworks 
of the European Courts: (1) natural justice safeguards; and (2) reconciliation of 
jurisdictional conflicts with national bars (‘double deontology’).  
Apart from the right to be heard in the CJEU Rules, the disciplinary powers do 
not provide natural justice rights (e.g., hearing, representation and appeal) for impugned 
counsel enshrined in Article 6(1) of the ECHR.145  An important point is whether there 
are enough judges with the requisite expertise to exercise such powers competently: 
 Absolutely correct, and this seems to me to be self-evident. For example, I have an 
advantage in this area over those of my colleagues who have principally been academics, 
for example…[f]or these types of matters, it is important that judges called upon to deal 
with disciplinary matters concerning counsel have the background necessary to see all of 
the issues.146 
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A disciplinary architecture needs to ensure that counsel can be confident that the judges 
and registrars are familiar with the realities and ethics of forensic advocacy.147  
The problem of ‘double deontology’ entails jurisdictional conflicts between 
international courts and national bars. This comprises two facets, namely, prescriptive 
conflicts between national and international codes of conduct and conflicts between the 
disciplinary jurisdictions of national bars and international courts. While this has arisen 
before international criminal tribunals,148 the rarity of disciplinary proceedings before the 
European Courts has hitherto precluded its occurrence. One judge has surmised: 
On that problem, it is likely that the EU Courts would be in a stronger position than the 
international criminal tribunals towards national bars because they can invoke the Article 
10 duty of cooperation of the Member States, which is broad, to compel national bars to 
respect the jurisdiction of the Courts.149  
 
The essence of the problem is that counsel may be investigated for the same matter by 
two jurisdictions according to different standards. Without regulatory certainty, counsel 
lack the freedom necessary to discharge their professional duties effectively.  
To preclude double deontology, national bars should relinquish disciplinary 
jurisdiction concerning conduct before the European Courts in exchange for their direct 
participation in the Courts’ disciplinary procedures. While national bars have the right of 
participation in the ICC framework for defence counsel,150 they have not fully 
relinquished their jurisdiction. The practice of the international criminal tribunals 
illustrates that the supremacy of international courts’ disciplinary jurisdictions is vital to 
ensure that all counsel respect the common standards, especially when those standards 
conflict with those of their home bars. 
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 4  The Articulation of Common Ethical Standards  
The feasibility of the prescription of common ethical standards for counsel depends upon 
the cooperation of three key actors: (1) the European Courts; (2) the national bars; and (3) 
the CCBE. While the CCBE is not a ‘federal bar’, it is nevertheless the logical forum for 
the drafting of codes of conduct for the European Courts for three reasons. First, the 
CCBE membership comprises national bars of all EU members and almost all of Council 
of Europe (‘CoE’) members.151 Secondly, the CCBE has the experience of having drafted 
its Code of Conduct applicable to transnational legal services within the Common 
Market. Thirdly, judges at both Courts have independently recommended the CCBE. 
Finally, the CCBE has the technical expertise concerning counsel’s ethics. 
The participation of national bars through the CCBE is crucial for the authority of 
the standards. According to the President of the General Court: 
Although I can anticipate that many national bars would not be in favour of a ‘European 
bar’, I can see intellectual arguments in favour of such an idea. We have some 700,000 
lawyers who now may plead before the Court, from 27 Member States all with their own 
deontological rules, so there are strong arguments for the Court to only deal with one bar 
and one set of rules.152 
 
Consultation with the judges would also be essential:  
If the CCBE were to adopt a code of conduct for cases before the CJEU, the judges of 
both the EU Courts would necessarily be consulted as part of that process for our views. 
That would likely be the way in which such a project could be achieved. Having 
previously served as the CCBE Representative to the ECJ as part of its Permanent 
Delegation, I can imagine that there would be interest within the CCBE to undertake such 
a project.153 
 
The idea of CCBE-drafted standards is of interest to judges at both European Courts. 
Despite the considerable differences between the two Courts, there are factors that 
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militate for the adoption of similar codes of conduct through the CCBE: (1) the 
anticipated EU accession to the ECHR; (2) the shared 27 states which are both EU and 
CoE members; (3) shared regional legal cultures; and (4) as explored above, shared 
ethical and procedural issues in practice such as conflicts of interest and misleading the 
court. While each Court has its own particular jurisdiction, there is a sufficient basis for 
CCBE-drafted standards to be articulated for both Courts to promote consistency.  
 A key dynamic of the drafting process is the instinct to favour the familiar, 
namely principles that derive from one’s own national legal culture. To prevent the 
process from descending into a clash between the merits of these different cultures, 
committees will often adopt an approach that focuses upon finding the lowest common 
denominator among competing principles. Where it is impossible to do so because the 
difference is too great, controversial issues are redacted to preserve areas of agreement.  
This dynamic promotes minimal standards because it provides a veto for those 
jurisdictions with the laxest standards, which results in the irony that those areas most in 
need of normativity in practice are the least likely to be addressed.  
Although the ILA Hague Principles suggest that there are areas where different 
national approaches are capable of synthesis, they also illustrate the limitations of 
minimal standards. To articulate common standards in areas of national disagreement, 
principles need to be selected that promote the procedural integrity of the European 
Courts in light of practical realities. For example, the Continental scepticism of employed 
lawyers’ independence is arguably more likely to promote strict ethics than the 
permissive English approach. However, the stricter common law rules on witnesses are 
preferable to the relaxed Continental rules due to the party-centred evidentiary process. 
Thus, the drafting process should not entail bartering amongst national jurisdictions but 
rather a pragmatic selection of principles to protect the integrity of the judicial process  
 
5  Conclusions 
This article has examined the procedural rules concerning advocacy at the European 
Courts and certain ethical problems that have emerged in practice. While ethical issues 
have been relatively rare and minor before the CJEU, they have occurred more frequently 
and seriously before the ECtHR. This suggests that the prescription of ethical standards 
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for counsel is more necessary for the latter than for the former. However, certain issues 
such as dishonesty and documentary evidence have arisen in the practice of both Courts 
and ongoing EU membership expansion can potentially increase the relevance of counsel 
misconduct before the CJEU. Thus, it is suggested that the prescription of codes of 
conduct for counsel would be a useful step to promote the procedural integrity of both 
Courts. 
Qualification requirements, ethical standards, and disciplinary powers were 
examined with reference to the procedural rules and practice of the European Courts as 
well as the ILA Hague Principles. While certain problems are more important before one 
Court than the other, in general the issues that were identified are common to both. 
Concerning qualification requirements, the bifurcation between agents and lawyers is 
doubtful with reference to the principle of equality of arms as well as cases involving 
questionable conduct by agents. Despite the important differences in the jurisdictions and 
procedures of the respective Courts – notably the greater role of evidence in ECtHR 
proceedings – issues such as dishonesty, the authenticity of documentary evidence, 
appropriate handling of witnesses, and breaching judicial orders are relevant to both. 
Regarding disciplinary powers, the importance of natural justice guarantees for counsel 
(in particular, the expertise of the judges) and the harmonization of international 
disciplinary jurisdiction with those of national bars are also common problems. 
The articulation of common ethical standards is about not only solving existing 
problems but also precluding potential ones. For example, there has been no suggestion 
in practice that ex parte communications (e.g., between agents and judges of the same 
nationality) are a major problem at either Court. Prescribed standards154 can nevertheless 
serve a deterrent function. Common standards also promote the creation of an 
international judicial culture amongst lawyers from diverse national jurisdictions. Finally, 
such standards would arguably promote institutional legitimacy in the outside world.  
Interviews with judges, registrars, and counsel suggest that the CCBE is the best 
forum for the drafting of codes of conduct. The CCBE, as a common organization for 
national bars, can serve as an important focal point between the bars and the Courts. 
Despite the considerable differences between the jurisdictions, procedures, and 
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memberships of the two Courts, there is a case for the CCBE to draft codes for both 
Courts. This would not only strengthen the authority of the putative codes of conduct, as 
the agreed text amongst the various jurisdictions, but would also go some way towards 
precluding the double deontology problem through their adoption by the national bars.  
Even anodyne standards provide a textual framework within which counsel and 
judges can better address the entire field of professional ethics before the Courts. 
Accretion through practice can provide convergence in those areas upon which 
agreement was not possible. What is necessary is a common foundation concerning the 
role of the advocate as a servant of the judicial system and an independent intermediary 
between court and client. In the nascent process of professionalization of advocacy in the 
international judicial system, this shared European legal culture is an important factor in 
the continuing formation of an common international judicial culture.  
